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response  to a preferential  tariff change.  exchange  rates.
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The number of regional integration agreements  (RIAs) has increased dramatically
in the last decade. In fact, nearly all members of the WTO belong now to one or more
RIAs.  The recent proliferation of RIAs has created renewed interest in their impact on
both member and non-member countries. One of the major concerns is the effect on the
terms of trade faced by non-member countries. As discussed in Winters (1997), this
effect should be a major focus when assessing  non-member  countries' welfare.
In a world of differentiated  products, even a "small" country or RIA can affect its
terms of trade by changing tariff rates. Winters and Chang (2000) have estimated terms-
of-trade effects associated with Spain's accession to the EEC. And in their 1999 paper,
Chang and Winters (henceforth CW) have shown in the case of MERCOSUR that non-
member countries suffer a decline in their terms of trade and that this decline is due to
their reaction to the improved market access by preferred rival competitors within the
integrating market. CW have also shown that Brazil's MFN trade liberalization results in
a terms-of-trade  loss for Brazil and a gain for exporters  to Brazil.  l
This paper extends CW's  work in  several ways. First, CW  only include the
Argentine product categories that are present in Brazil's market, and these merely cover
38% of  all Argentine product categories in  1991 and  55% in  1995. We extend the
empirical analysis by examining how the price response of non-member countries is
affected by the presence or absence of Argentine product categories in Brazil's market.
Second, the mere threat of entry by preferred suppliers may be sufficient to discipline
non-member incumbents within a 'contestable' market. It may be reasonable to expect
' Ashenfelter et al. (1998) employ a similar pricing methodology in a domestic context for two firms as
marginal costs change in a single firm and for the industry. In particular, they regress the price one firm,
2that when conditions facing potential Argentine entrants into Brazil's market improve,
i.e., when Brazil's  market becomes more contestable for Argentine suppliers (as with
RIA  formation), incumbents will  attempt to  deter entry by  reducing prices. Third,
Feenstra (1989) has shown in a seminal paper on the 'pass-through" to domestic prices of
changes in tariffs and exchange rates that the two pass-through effects should be equal.
We provide an empirical test of this "symmetry" hypothesis as a check on the model.
Though contestability and issues concerning 'limit pricing' have been examined
as far back as Bain (1949, 1954) and Hines (1957), they have not been studied in an
international setting and certainly not in the context of regional integration. 2 This paper
examines whether market presence and contestability  matter in international markets. It
will show that trade policy changes affect incumbent suppliers, and that this  effect
depends on the degree to which there are current rivals, and on how contestable the
markets are.
As mentioned above, the extent to which a change in tariff or exchange rate is
reflected in a  change in domestic prices has been examined in a  seminal paper by
Feenstra (1989).  He assumes a foreign and a domestic firm producing a differentiated
product and acting as Bertrand competitors  in the US market. 4 Combining the approach
on exchange rate "pass-through" and the imperfect competition approach on tariff "pass-
through", Feenstra shows from profit maximizing conditions that these "pass-throughs"
Staples, charges for a product on the marginal cost of that product as well as on the cost of Office Depot,
another rival firm in the industry.
2  Baumol  et al. (1988)  offer  a general  exposition  on the market  behavior  of incumbent  firms  and  the threat
of entry.  They argue that markets may in fact be 'perfectly contestable' so that price cannot be above
average cost.
3  For an extensive survey of the literature on exchange rate "pass-through", see Goldberg and Knetter
(1997). They state that a 50% exchange  rate "pass-through"  is about average for the estimated responses for
shipments  to the US. They also examine the "symmetry" hypothesis.
4  Feenstra also generalizes  his results to many varieties.
3should be equal to each other. He tests the hypothesis and finds that they are equal (the
"symmetry" hypothesis) in the case of both compact trucks and heavy motorcycles, with
a full "pass-through" (of unity) or more for motorcycles and a partial one (of 0.58) for
trucks.
From these results, Feenstra concludes that a tariff increase can improve the US
terms of trade for trucks: a 1% increase in the tariff factor (1 + t) raises the consumer
price by 0.58% and thus lowers the import price by 0.42%. On the other hand, a tariff
increase does not improve the US terms of trade for motorcycles: with little competition
to Japanese motorcycles in the US, the retail price rises by the full increase in the tariff
and the pre-tariff import price remains unchanged. In other words, price response is
affected by the degree of market presence: domestic presence is greater for trucks than
for motorcycles  and implies a smaller "pass-through."  5
These issues are examined in this paper in the context of the formation of a
regional agreement. The approach differs from Feenstra's in the sense that we assume
two foreign firms acting as Bertrand competitors in a third market,6 we estimate the
impact of both preferential and MFN tariff changes, and we use the entire tariff structure
rather than examining selected products in detail. By using the entire tariff structure, we
impose an equal price reaction across products, except for differences due to market
presence and contestability.
Feenstra's  estimation covers the period 1974-1987 when the  US had not  yet
formed RIAs with Canada or Mexico. Thus, MFN tariff changes apply to all sources of
imports in his analysis. This is not true in our case where the period of analysis is 1991-
1996 when MERCOSUR was in place and where MFN tariff changes only apply to non-
S  For more on these issues, see also Feenstra (1995).
4MERCOSUR sources. To cover all sources of imports, as in Feenstra, we must consider
both MFN and preferential tariff changes. This is done in Section 4.3.
The empirical analysis  focuses on MERCOSUR  where both preferential and MFN
trade liberalization have taken place. As the largest economy in MERCOSUR, Brazil is
chosen as the home market. The suppliers included in the analysis are Argentina, Brazil's
main trading partner in MERCOSUR,  and the US, Brazil's largest non-member supplier. 7
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and Brazil's trade
pattern and policies. Section 3 provides an empirical model specification. Section 4
estimates the termns-of-trade  effects of MFN and preferential trade liberalization. Sub-
section 4.1  examines how  they  are  affected by  market  presence,  Sub-section 4.2
examines how terms-of-trade effects are affected by contestability, and Sub-section 4.3
deals with tariff and exchange rate "pass-through".  Section 5 concludes and suggests
additional work. 8
2. Trade Policies and Data
Brazil undertook unilateral reforms over  1989-1995. It liberalized most of its
trade within MERCOSUR  over 1991-1995,  with an initial 50% cut at the end of 1991 and
the rest over 1992-1995.9 We use detailed micro level tariff and trade data, collected at
6  See  also  Helpman  and  Krugman  (1989)  for a use  of this approach.
7  Paraguay  and Uruguay,  the two smaller  partners  in MERCOSUR,  were not included  in the analysis
due  to data limnitations.
8  Assuming  a three-country  model  with  two exporters  selling  a differentiated  product  in a third market
and acting  as Bertrand  competitors,  we can solve for the tcrms-of-trade  effects  of MFN and preferential
trade liberalization  and examine how these are affected by  demand, cost, market presence and
contestability  conditions.  The analytical  results  support  the empirical  findings.  The simple model  is not
presented  here  and is available  from  the authors  upon  request.
MERCOSUR's  internal  liberalization  was started in late 1991  with the signing of the Treaty  of
Asunci6n. The members  initially  planned  a full Customs  Union  by the  start of 1995  but due to political
pressures  from within,  this was not fully  achieved, By late 1994,  after much  contention,  the Ouro  Preto
Protocol  was signed.  It allowed  countries  to exclude certain products  from internal free trade and
implemented  the Common  External  Tariff  (CET)  for most product  headings. All countries  were allowed
Sthe Harmonized Tariff System (HTS) at the 6-digit level for the period 1991-1996, in
order to estimate the effect of Brazil's trade policies on non-member prices.'" The trade
data used to compute unit values were obtained from UN's Comtrade database, and the
tariff data were provided by UNCTAD and the MERCOSUR  Secretariat.
Table 1 is based on data reported by Brazil. It shows the main incumbents in the
Brazilian market and their relative importance. The US and Argentina have the largest
share of Brazil's imports in 1996, with the US share over 22%. Other suppliers such as
Germany and Japan also have significant shares, though Japan's share had fallen below
that of Italy by 1996.
The estimation equations in Section 3 are derived from a Bertrand competition
model.  The share of the US in Brazil's imports is over 2.5 times the 8.8% share of
Germany, the second-largest non-member exporter to Brazil. As the largest exporter to
Brazil, we choose to examine  US pricing behavior in Brazil's market.
At the commodity level, Table 2-based  on data reported by Brazil--shows the
number of products among the HS 6-digit headings sold to Brazil by the major exporting
countries listed in Table 1. The top portion of the table lists the number of headings that
fall within  a  specified share  category for  1991 and  1995.  For  example, in  1991
Argentina's share of the Brazilian import market was 100% in 33 product headings,
between 80 and 100% in 97 headings and zero for 2,783 headings. The total number of
product headings was 4478 and 4789 for 1991 and 1995, respectively.
The lower half of the table shows what percentage  of the number of products have
greater than 0, 5, 10%, etc. of the market share for each major exporter. Argentina is a
exceptions,  Brazil  28 out of approximately  5000  HS-6  headings  from internal  free trade-see Chang  and
Winters  (1999)  and  Olarreaga  and Soloaga  (1998)  for details  of the transition  of these  tariff  rates.
6major player within the Brazilian market. For example, the products that have more than
5% of market share make up 18.4% and 22.6% of the total number of product headings in
1991 and 1995, respectively.  The largest player in Brazil's market is the US, with 65% in
1991 and 70% in 1995 of the total number of headings having over 5% of the import
share.
The Argentine product headings exported to Brazil increased from 37.9% of all
Argentine headings in 1991 to 55.3% in  1995. This implies a significant expansion of
product categories exported by Argentina over this period. However, there remains a
large number of products that never entered Brazil's market from Argentina over the
entire integration period. CW included in their sample only those non-member exports to
Brazil that were also exported by Argentina. Our approach differs from CW in the sense
that we include the 62.1% of product headings in 1991 and 44.7% in 1995 that were not
included in their analysis.
Using the disaggregated  data, we can identify which products exported by the US
have an Argentine rival in Brazil's market and which do not. We distinguish between
these two groups of products because we are interested in the reaction of non-member
exporters to the presence and to the potential entry of an Argentine supplier.
It is not possible to determine, at the 6-digit level, whether Argentina actually
produces the products that it does not export to  Brazil, though we know whether it
exports them to the ROW. Since  Argentine data at this level of disaggregation  only starts
in 1993, we use the ROW as reporter and examine its imports from Argentina. With the
combined informnation  on Brazil's  imports and on the ROW's  imports of Argentine
products, we can determine which products were exported by Argentina to Brazil only,
'°  The  data  themselves  are  more  detailed  than  6-digits,  but these  are country  specific  and comparing
7which to the world but not to Brazil, which to both markets, and which were not exported
at all.
3. Estimating the Effect of Market Presence and Contestability
3.1. CW's estimation  equations
Our estimation equations are derived from those of  CW by adding terms to
capture the effects of market presence and contestability. CW develop a simple model
where products are differentiated  by the supplier country, as in Armington (1969), and
the export markets are segmented. Non-member country firms export to Brazil's market
and to the ROW. Firms choose local currency prices (in Brazil's  and in the ROW's
market) to maximize their profits, taking input costs, exchange rates, tariffs, and the
demand structure for the differentiated products, as given. They also take other firms'
prices  as  given,  acting  as  Bertrand  competitors. The  model  assumes  imperfect
competition among exporters  in Brazil's market, which is more likely to hold among the
larger suppliers.
The dependent variable is the US real export price to Brazil relative to its real
export price to the ROW. The reason for using this relative price is to purge it from world
market shocks affecting both Brazil and the ROW, and isolate the impact of Brazil's
policy.'" CW estimated reduced form equation is:
ln  )  =c. + A,ln  ]  ln  + a  InTl  (1)
Pr I  Qr  ),  e 1Q 1 t  n  erQrj,  eLeQ,i,
or
products  across  countries  at that  level  is not possible.
"  One would  expect  this relative  price  to fall  for non-members  with  the creation  of MERCOSUR,  and  to
rise for members.  The relative  price,  averaged  over  all tariff  headings,  decreased  by some 16%  for the US
8(  1J Pl /Q  )  =  c, +flnr 1 , +g  lnrT;  +  In -J I21  [erQ  ],  [eQ,  ]  (2)
where p 1 (p,)  is the non-member firm tariff-inclusive  export price to Brazil (the ROW);
r(r*) is Brazil's  tariff factor on imports from non-member (Argentina), equal to  l+t
(l+t*), where t (t*) is the ad valorem tariff rate;
Qi  (Qr) is the general price level of Brazil (ROW);
e, (er)  is the supplier country's currency price of a Brazilian REAL (ROW currency),
say the dollar/REAL (dollar/ROW) exchange rate. Similarly, e  represents the bilateral
exchange rate of  Argentina  and Brazil; and
.(w*) is an index of non-member  (Argentina)  input prices in local currency.
There is no constant in equations (1) and (2) since ci is commodity-specific.  Thus,
the equations provide a "within" estimation. Equation (1) estimates the pricing equation
of a US firm exporting to the two segmented markets, Brazil (denoted by subscript 1) and
the ROW (denoted by subscript r). Equation (1) implies that the US exporter's tariff
inclusive price (in Brazilian REAL) relative to its export price to the ROW depends on its
cost of selling in Brazil's market and of selling in the ROW, and on Argentina's cost of
selling in Brazil' market. Equation (2) separates out the tariff factors, the main variables
of interest. 12 We allow the coefficient "f' to differ from "/,8" and "g*" to differ from "6"
in equation (2) in order to test the "symmetry"  hypothesesf= ,B,  and g* = M" in Section 4.
over  1991-1996  and  increased  by some  4%  for  Argentina  for 1993-1996  (data  for 1991-1992  at this level  of
disaggregation  are missing for Argentina).
12  The tariff factor for the rest of the world is assumed to be constant and is not included in equations (1)
and (2).
9Note that the tariffs are commodity and time varying, whereas the last three terms
of equation (2)--which are essentially macroeconomic  variables (exchange rate, general
price level, and input price index)--are only time varying. Since the last three terms of
equation (2) only vary with time, CW also estimate equation (3) which is a variant of
equation (2). Equation (3) regresses the ratio of tariff inclusive prices on the tariff factors,
and on yearly time dummies in order to sweep out all the common effects across the
commodities  over the relevant  years. Equation (3) is:
InC  P1  0=  c, + f ln r,, + g* ln r,  + Yearly Time Dummies  (3)
Pr  )u
3.2. Market presence and contestability
Estimating both equations (2) and (3) should provide an additional check on our
results  and  add  confidence in  their  robustness if  they  are similar. We  estimate a
transformation of equations (2) and (3). The sample CW use includes only those non-
member products with direct competition from Argentine producers. This paper extends
their work by exploring the impact of Argentine presence in Brazil's  market and of
contestability.  In order to determine whether the presence of Argentina is important, we
include all the products exported by the US to Brazil, whether they have Argentine
competitors or not.  In other words, US products with no Argentine presence in Brazil's
market are reintroduced  into the universe of headings for examination.
We separate the products that the US exports into two types: first,  a  set of
products where Brazil reports 0 or 1 year of imports from Argentina; and second, a set of
products where Brazil reports more than 1 year of imports from Argentina. Product
10headings in  the first set are defined as those with no Argentine presence in Brazil's
market, and product headings in the second set are defined as those with Argentine
presence.
Analytically, we modify equations (2) and (3) by changing  parametersf and g* to:
f  = b 1 D] + b;D;  and  g=  d,DI + dl4D,
where D, and D, are dummy variables for US product headings. The first takes
the value of 1 when there is no Argentine presence, and the second takes the value of 1
when there is Argentine presence in the Brazilian  market as defined above.
In addition to the importance  of the presence of Argentina in Brazil's market, we
can further refine the analysis by examining the effects of "contestability". Since there is
a possibility of entry by those Argentine products that initially are not exported to Brazil,
we examine whether there are added effects on US export pricing when the Argentine
products are exported to the ROW.  13 The reason is that if Argentina exports to the ROW,
it may be able to supply Brazil's market more easily by shifting sales from the ROW to
Brazil, and may represent a viable threat to the US in Brazil's market even though the
Argentine products are not currently present there. The same might also hold if Argentina
is already present in Brazil's market. Analytically,  this implies adding two more dummy
variables to  the  definition of  parameters f  and  g*, with  the four  dummy variables
representing the cases of Argentine  presence or absence in either Brazil or the ROW.
Finally, note that CW also estimated an equation of Argentine prices relative to
non-member prices in Brazil's market. Since our data include product headings for which
Argentina is not present in Brazil's market, this equation cannot be estimated.
114. Estimation Results
We report the main results in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 presents the effect of market
presence, while Table 4 presents both the effect of market presence and contestability. As
shown in Table 3, we have two specifications. The first column (column a) shows the
results of estimating equation (2), with modifications  described above for the presence or
absence of Argentina in Brazil's market, and the second column (column b) shows the
results  of  estimating  equation  (3)  with  the  time  dummies  and  dropping  the
macroeconomic  variables, and with the same modifications. As shown in Tables 3 and 4,
the regressions are estimated with over 8,000 degrees  of freedom.
4.1. Market Presence
Starting with  Table  3,  note  the  similarity of  results  obtained  in  the  two
specifications (columns a and b). Second, all the coefficients have the right sign, except
e  which is not statistically significant. Third, the effect of Brazil's MFN tariff (rows 1
and 2) is significant in both specifications.  Fourth, the coefficient of row 1 (no Argentine
presence) is larger than that of row 2 (Argentine  presence) in both specifications,  though
the difference is not statistically significant. This is shown at the bottom of the table
where equality of the coefficients cannot be rejected. Fifth, the coefficient of row 1 is
marginally larger than  1 (in  a  statistical sense) and the coefficient of row 2  is not
significantly  different from 1.
Thus, the reduction of MFN rates seems to have been fully passed through to the
Brazilian consumers when Argentina is present (row 2) and marginally more than fully
when Argentina is not (row 1). In other words, the results suggest that Brazil's terms of
3 As noted in Section  2, data on Argentine production  are not available at this level of disaggregation.
12trade are unlikely to  have worsened with respect to  US imports following MFN
liberalization.
Exarmining  the  preferential tariffs, we see  that  the  reduction of  Brazil's
preferential  tariff  on Argentine  imports  lowers  US export  prices,  though  not significantly
when  Argentina  is absent  (row  3). However,  when  Argentina  is present  in Brazil's  market
(row 4), the preferential  tariff has a statistically  significant  effect  on US export  prices.
The price effect--as  a percent  of the shange  in the preferential  tariff factor-is about  one
fifth (22.2%  in column  a and 17.8%  in column  b). Thus, the presence  of Argentina  in
Brazil's  market  implies  a greater  US  price response  to a reduction  in Brazil's preferential
tariff  on Argentine  imports,  i.e., it implies  a greater  US terms-of-trade  loss and a greater
terms-of-trade  gain for Brazil. Even though the coefficients  in row 4 are statistically
significant  while  those in row 3 are not, tests for equality  of these coefficients  shown  at
the bottom  of the table indicate  that equality  cannot  be rejected.
The results of Table 3 show that Argentine  presence  implies a smaller price
response  to Brazil's MFN  tariff  change  but a larger response  to Brazil's preferential  tariff
change,  though the differences  have been found not to be statistically  significant.  One
possible  reason  is that contestability  matters  for price response  and that abstracting  from
it leads  to biased  estimation.  In fact, Table  4 shows  estimation  results  with contestability
included  as an explanatory  variable,  and market  presence  has a statistically  significant
impact  on price  response  in this case,  with  a smaller price  response  to Brazil's  MFN  tariff
change  and a larger response  to Brazil's  preferential  tariff change.
Why are the coefficients  different  when there is Argentine  presence  in Brazil's
market? In the case of the MFN tariff, the price response  coefficient  in column  a of
Table 4 is 1.625 when Argentina  is absent (row 1) but only .889 when Argentina  is
13present (row 3), and similarly for column b. This can be explained as follows. Argentina
was not  subject to  Brazil's MFN tariff over the 1991-96 period examined when the
preferential rate applied. Now, if Argentina is absent in Brazil's market, Brazil's MFN
tariff reduction affects 100% of its imports. On the other hand, if Argentina has, say, a
40% import share in Brazil's market for a given product, a reduction in the MFN rate
only affects 60% of imports. It is thus no surprise that the MFN tariff has a significantly
larger effect on US prices when Argentina is absent  than when it is present.
On the other hand, the price effect of preferential tariffs is significantly larger
when Argentina is present (0.447 in row 7 of column a) than when Argentina is absent (-
.149 in row 5, and not significantly different from zero), and similarly for column b.
This  is not  surprising since giving preferences for  Argentine products that are not
exported to Brazil has no impact on competitiveness in Brazil's market and should not
affect other exporters' price behavior. On the other hand, preferences given to Argentine
exporters who  are present in  Brazil's  market  affect competitiveness and  the  price
behavior of US exporters in that market.
Thus, we conclude that market presence matters and that its impact on the US
price response varies with the type of tariff under consideration. Argentine presence
implies a smaller price response to Brazil's MFN tariff change but a larger response to
Brazil's preferential tariff change.
4.2. Contestability
Table  4  also  examines the  effect of contestability, i.e., it  examines whether
Argentine exports to the ROW affect US price behavior in Brazil's market. One would
expect it to be easier for Argentina  to increase its exports to Brazil if it already exports to
14the ROW, and that the related price effect would be more important if Argentina had no
presence in Brazil's market. The contestability  effects are represented in Table 4 by the
symbol "A".
If Argentina is absent from Brazil's market (rows 1 and 2), a decrease in the MFN
tariff makes Argentina less competitive  in Brazil's market, i.e., the threat of entry when
Argentina exports  to  the  ROW becomes weaker as  the  MFN tariff  is  decreased.
Therefore, the contestability effect is negative (-.720), and the US changes its price by
.905 of the change in the MFN tariff factor (= 1.625 - .720) rather than by 1.625 (see
column a). This effect does not hold when Argentina  is already present in Brazil's market
(rows 3 and 4), in which case Argentina exporting to the ROW has no significant effect
on US pricing in Brazil's market.
Examining the  effects of  Brazil's  preferential liberalization on  US  pricing
behavior, we see that when Argentina is not present in Brazil and does not export to the
ROW  (row  5), there  is  no  statistically significant effect  on  US  pricing behavior.
However, when Argentina is not present in Brazil but does export to the ROW (row 6),
we have a quantitatively and statistically significant pricing effect (over 50% of any
change in Brazil's preferential tariff factor). This indicates that US exporters do react to
preferential tariffs even when they have no current preferred competitors within the
Brazilian market but face potential competitors.  The opposite holds when Argentina
already has a strong presence in Brazil (row 7 and 8). US exporters respond statistically
significantly to a preferential tariff when Argentina is already present in Brazil's market,
and Argentine exports to the ROW have no statistically  significant  additional effect.
As noted earlier, Argentina's presence in Brazil's market reduces the US price
response to MFN tariffs and raises it with respect to preferential tariffs. With respect to
15the degree  of  contestability as  measured by  Argentina's presence in  the  ROW, if
Argentina has no presence in Brazil's market, then contestability also reduces the US
price  response to  MFN  tariffs and  raises it  with  respect to  preferential tariffs. If
Argentina is present in Brazil's market, contestability  has no significant additional effect
on price response.
These results imply that regional integration may have pro-competitive effects
under contestability and no market presence. If Argentina has no presence in Brazil's
market both before and after MERCOSUR is formed, then the price response of US firms
is larger if Argentina is present in ROW markets. In that case, MERCOSUR results in
lower US prices.  Lower prices imply greater consumption in Brazil's market, and since
Argentina is not present, it implies a larger volume of imports by Brazil from US firms
selling more at a lower price and earning smaller rents.  Thus, our results suggest that if,
for some product headings, countries are absent from each others' markets, contestability
implies that regional integration between these countries has pro-competitive effects,
with greater exports by and lower prices for non-members, and lower consumer prices
and  greater  consumption in  member  countries.  In  those  circumstances, regional
integration results in a type of "trade creation", not between member countries, but by
raising Brazil's imports from the ROW.
Finally, since Argentina is not subject to Brazil's MFN tariff, one expects a larger
price reaction when Argentina is not present in Brazil's market (row 1) than when it is
present (row 3), as is found in Table 4. However, once the effect of contestability is
included, the difference in price reaction due to market presence is no longer statistically
significant. Table 4, column a, shows for MFN tariffs that the price reaction in the case of
absence in Brazil's market but with a threat of entry equals .905 (rows 1 + 2), while the
16price reaction with market presence is 1.138 (rows 3 + 4).  The same results obtain with
estimates in column b.  Similarly, in the case of preferential liberalization, US price
reaction is larger with Argentine  presence than in its absence. However,  once the effect of
contestability is included, the difference is price effect is no longer significant.
Also, comparing the case of presence and no contestability with that of absence
plus contestability, for the MFN tariff, the effect of presence is .889 and the effect of
absence plus contestability is .905. For preferential tariffs, these effects are .447 (row 7)
and .371 (rows 5+6), respectively. Thus, for both MFN and preferential tariffs, the US
price reaction is  similar and not  statistically different when Argentina is present in
Brazil's market and when it is absent but the threat of entry exists. That presence and
threat of presence have qualitatively similar effects comes as no surprise. However, it is
surprising that their quantitative  impact are found not to be statistically  different either.
4.3. Pass-Through
The price effects of the exchange rates between the US currency and those of
Brazil and the ROW are shown in Table 3 by the estimates of ,BI  (row 5) and P2 (row 6),
respectively, and the effect of the exchange rate between the currencies of Argentina and
Brazil is indicated by the estimate of 8* (row 7). Since PI  = 1.222 is not significantly
different from b, = 1.281 or from bl'  = 1.116, the "symmetry" hypothesis cannot be
rejected for the MFN tariff. The "pass-through" is not significantly  different from one in
the case of the dollar/REAL exchange rate (Is) and the MFN tariff when Argentina is
present (bl'),  but  is  marginally statistically different from  one  for  the tariff  when
Argentina is absent (b1).
17The effect ,B2  of a change in the 'US  to ROW' exchange rate is negative and
significant, and of similar absolute value as Pi, with (131  + 132)  not significantly different
from zero. This is as expected  since the numerator  of the dependent variable is in Brazil's
currency while the denominator is in the ROW's currency. Another reason is that the
index of input prices w appears both in the term with 1,1  and with 132,  and since changes in
w should not affect the relative price, one would expect PIl  + ,B2  = 0. The effect 6* of a
change  in  the  'Argentina  to  Brazil'  exchange  rate  is  not  significant. Thus,  the
"symmetry" hypothesis does not hold between the Brazil-Argentina exchange rate and
the preferential tariff rate when Argentina is present.
The issue of "symmetry" and degree of pass-through can also be examined by
considering effects  of  Brazil's  policy  with  respect to  US  and  Argentine  imports
simultaneously.  In other words, we can examine  (Pi + 8*) which measures the effect of a
change in both the 'US to  Brazil'  and the 'Argentina to Brazil'  exchange rates, and
compare it with (b 1 + di) which measures the effect of  a change in both the MFN and
preferential tariff when Argentina is  absent, or with  (bl'  + dl')  when Argentina is
present.  14
The effect of the two exchange rates 131  + o* = 1.158 is not significantly different
from the effect of both MFN and preferential tariffs when Argentina is present (bl'  + dl'
= 1.338), and is not significantly different from one. Thus, the "symmetry" hypothesis
between the pass-through of tariffs and exchange rates cannot be rejected when Argentina
is present, and neither can a complete or full exchange rate "pass-through."
14 Note, though, that even if the MFN and preferential tariffs together have the same effect on importables
as the two exchange rates, the latter also affect exportables,  and the "symmetry"  hypothesis need not hold.
18Feenstra (1989) confirmed the "symmetry" hypothesis for US imports of compact
trucks and  heavy motorcycles from  Japan in the  case of MFN tariffs. Our analysis
indicates that the "symmetry" hypothesis holds for Brazilian imports from the US for
MFN tariffs, for MFN and preferential tariffs taken together, but not for preferential
tariffs alone.
5. Conclusion and Suggestions  for Additional  Work
5.1. Conclusion
Based on the use of detailed data, CW found that Brazil's MFN and preferential
liberalization affected non-members' terms of trade. This paper confirms their findings
and extends their analysis by examining the additional impact of market presence and
contestability. Our analysis provides evidence to support the idea that presence by a
member country does make a difference  in non-member  pricing behavior. We show that
Argentina's presence in Brazil's market results in a smaller US price response to Brazil's
MFN tariff change and in a larger response to a preferential tariff change.
Since  we  do  not  have  data  on  Argentine production at  the  desired  level  of
disaggregation, we  used  the  ROW's  recorded  imports  from  Argentina  to  proxy
contestability. Our analysis provides a first step in measuring the effect of contestability
in an international setting.  We find that contestability plays no significant role when
Argentina is present in Brazil's market. When Argentina is absent from Brazil's market,
contestability lowers the US price response to changes in the MFN tariff and raises it
with respect to changes in the preferential tariff.  We also find that the effect of market
presence on the US price response to both MFN and preferential liberalization is not
statistically different from the effect of contestability  when there is no market presence.
19Our results on the "symmetry" hypothesis between the price effect of exchange
rates and tariff rates in the case of Brazil tend to support Feenstra's results for the US in
the case of MFN tariffs and of the sum of MFN and preferential  tariffs, but not in the case
of preferential tariffs alone.
Some implications are: i) presence of member countries in each others' markets
reduces the terms-of-trade loss from lower external trade barriers-thus  lowering the
optimal external tariff--and raises the terms-of-trade gain from forming a trade bloc; ii)
for  those  product headings where member countries are  absent from  each  others'
markets, a threat of entry (higher degree of contestability)  has the same effect as market
presence; iii) presence in the partner's market has an ambiguous impact on the welfare
effect of bloc formation because, though the terms-of-trade gains are larger, the trade
volume on which these gains are obtained is smaller; and iv) for products where member
countries are absent from each others' market, a greater threat of entry has a positive
impact on the welfare effect of bloc formation and has general pro-competitive  effects.
5.2. Suggestions for Additional Work
Argentina is defined as having no presence in Brazil or the ROW if it exports 0
or 1 year to these markets, and it is defined as being present if it exports more than 1
year. This definition is somewhat arbitrary, and we plan to try an alternative definition
where absence is defined as 0 to 2 years of exports and presence is defined as more than 2
years.
Argentine presence or  absence in  Brazil's  market is  used as  an  explanatory
variable. The question is whether this variable is affected by the MFN and preferential
trade policy changes that are being examined. If so, estimation results may be biased.
20Recall that products can be present in i = 0, 1, ..., 6 years.  If i is randomly distributed
over time,  then absence or  presence are  not affected by  the policy reforms  being
examined. Clearly, there can be no variation over time for i = 0 or i = 6. We need to
examine whether there is a time pattern for i = 1. If there is no pattern over time, then
absence is not affected by the policy reforms, and hence neither is presence. If absence is
defined as 0 to 2 years of exports, then we must examine whether there is a time pattern
for i = 2 as well.
MERCOSUR was signed in 1991 but essentially came into effect in 1994. If we
examine presence or absence in the first three years versus the latter three years, we
might find a pattern with absence in the early period (say, presence in 0 or 1 year only)
and  presence in the later period (say, presence in 2 or 3 years). In that case, it might be
plausibly assumed that the change is due to MERCOSUR and thus our explanatory
variable would be endogenous. This might bias our estimation  results. This issue will also
be examined in a later version.
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1991  1996
Country  $ bil.  share%  $ bil.  share%
Argentina  1.75  7.6  7.09  12.6
Canada  0.59  2.5  1.38  2.4
Chile  0.53  2.3  1.00  1.8
China  0.08  0.3  1.25  2.2
France  0.65  2.8  1.41  2.5
UK  0.49  2.1  1.32  2.3
Germany  2.03  8.8  4.97  8.8
Italy  0.85  3.7  3.06  5.4
Japan  1.35  5.9  2.90  5.1
Korea  0.15  0.6  1.25  2.2
Mexico  0.23  1.0  1.02  1.8
USA  5.40  23.5  12.56  22.2
Total  14.07  61.2  39.19  69.4
World  $22.98  100.0  $56.47  100.0Table 2:  Number of Headings  in HS-6 which fall in Selected Market Shares in Brazil
% share (s)  CANADA  CHILE  CHINA  FRANCE  UK  .GERMANY  ITALY  JAPAN  KOREA  MEXICO  USA  ARGENTINA
91  95  91  95  91  95  91  95  91  95  91  95  91  95  91  95  91  95  91  95  91  95  91  95
100  5  2-  14  7.  2  2.  7  10.  12  7.  42  32.  31  132  20  9.  3  5.  4  2  172  99.  33  16
80<=s<1O0  7  8.  41  27,  4  4'  25  24.  23  14,  109  70,  35  33.  30  12.  16  132  9  8,  292  252,  97  83
60c=sc80  7  15.  14  30.  2  8'  27  27-  25  16,  114  1112  58  42j  50  27'  18  20.  11  12.  335  320,  68  83
40cs<60  16  16.  18  29,  7  17.  53  55,  41  34,  208  195.  83  91.  95  69,  14  39j  19  17.  535  546j  95  138
20<=s<40  29  402  35  50.  8  62  127  150.  79  97  491  483.  192  239,  230  182.  50  67.  24  49'  742  977,  171  237
15cs<20  14  21.  10  29,  12  46,  74  70.  57  62-  203  239  90  124j  127  95.  17  27.  20  22.  221  334.  69  101
10<s<15  22  27.  26  28-  11  67,  116  120,  101  116,  263  293.  136  213.  164  160,  22  69  21  47  252  340  101  145
5<sc<10  64  82.  34  72'  21  155.  186  240,  193  242'  398  425.  231  399.  314  270.  53  118.  42  82.  348  472'  188  283
0<s<5  636  1223.  222  1041.  292  997.  1240  1923.  1298  1738.  1020  1530,  1335  1892.  1008  1391,  411  1175'  294  728'  781  938.  873  1567
0  3678  3364.  4064  3485'  4119  3440.  2623  2179,  2649  2472,  1630  1420  2287  1752,  2440  2583,  3874  3265  4034  3831  800  520  2783  2145
TOTAL  4478  4798.  4478  4798.  4478  4798,  4478  4798.  4478  4798.  4478  4798.  4478  4798  4478  4798.  4478  4798-  4478  4798  4478  4798  4478  4798
>0%  0.179  0.299.  0.092  0.274.  0.080  0.283,  0.414  0.546.  0.408  0.485,  0.636  0.704  0.489  0.635'  0.455  0.462  0.135  0.320  0.099  0.202  0.821  0.892  0.379  0.553
>5%  0.037  0.044-  0.043  0.057.  0.015  0.075,  0.137  0.145.  0.119  0.123,  0.408  0.385j  0.191  0.241.  0.230  0.172.  0.043  0.075  0.033  0.050j  0.647  0.696  0.184  0.226
>10%  0.022  0.027-  0.035  0.042-  0.010  0.043,  0.096  0.095.  0.075  0.072'  0.319  0.2971 0.140  0.157.  0.160  0.115.  0.031  0.050'  0.024  0.033  0.569  0.598'  0.142  0.167
>15%  0.017  0.021.  0.029  0.036'  0.008  0.029.  0.070  0.070'  0.053  0.048j  0.261,  0.236.  0.109  0.113,  0.123  0.082'  0.026  0.036  0.019  0.023  0.513  0.527  0.119  0.137
>20%  0.014  0.017.  0.027  0.030.  0.005  0.019,  0.053  0.055,  0.040  0.035.  0.215  0.186.  0.089  0.087.  0.095  0.062.  0.023  0.030,  0.015  0.018-  0.464  0.457  0.104  0.116
>40%  0.008  0.009  0.019  0.019  0.003  0.006.  0.025  0.024.  0.023  0.015  0.106  0.085  0.046  0.037  0.044  0.024  0.011  0.016  0.010  0.008  0.298  0.254  0.065  0.067
>60%  0.004  0.005:  0.015  0.013.  0.002  0.003!  0.013  0.013  0.013  0.008:  0.059  0.044.  0.028  0.018.  0.022  0.010!  0.008  0.008.  0.005  0.005-  0.178  0.140.  0.044  0.038
>80%  0.003  0.002.  0.012  0.007:  0.001  0.001.  0.007  0.007.  0.008  0.004.  0.034  0.021!  0.015  0.010!  0.011  0.004!  0.004  0.004:  0.003  0.002j  0.104  0.073:  0.029  0.021Table 3: Estimation of Equations (2) and (3) and the Impact of Market Presence
a  b
Coefficient  Standard  Coefficient  Standard
Error  Error
MFN  b,  No Presence  1.281  0.14  1.277  0.15
b',  Presence  1.116  0.09  1.174  0.10
RIA  d,  No Presence  0.156  0.13  0.130  0.13
d',  Presence  0.222  0.08  0.178  0.09
ER*  I3  US/Brazil  1.222  0.13
12  US/ROW  -0.994  0.21
o  Arg/Brazil  -0.064  0.14
Time  Dummies  NO  YES
R2  0.577  0.174
EDF  8163  8160
bh= b'l  prob>F  0.323  0.554
F  0.980  0.350
d, = d',  prob>F  0.618  0.715
F  0.250  0.350
a. Equation (2).
b. Equation (3) with yearly time dummies.
* ER = exchange rateTable 4: Estimation of Equations (2) and (3) and the Impact of Contestability
a  b
Coefficient  Standard  Coefficient  Standard
Error  Error
MFN  b 1 No presence  1.625  0.19  1.634  0.20
+A  -0.720  0.30  -0.721  0.31
b'l  Presence  0.889  0.32  0.944  0.32
+A  0.249  0.33  0.263  0.33
RIA  d,  No presence  -0.149  0.17  -0.186  0.17
+A&  0.520  0.23  0.543  0.23
d'1 Presence  0.447  0.23  0.403  0.23
+A  /-0.257  0.23  -0.262  0.23
ER*  Pi  US/Brazil  1.260  0.13
132 US/ROW  -1.027  0.21
o'  Arg/Brazil  -0.105  0.14
Time Dummies  No  Yes
R  2  0.578  0.178
EDF  8159  8156
a. Equation  (2).
b. Equation  (3) with yearly  time dummies.
A represents  the added  effect  when  Argentina  exports  to the rest of the  world.
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